Within five days, two of Greenland’s leading research institutions publicly disclosed restrictions on cooperation with the United States.
On July 13, Greenland Institute of Natural Resources Director Josephine Nymand told KNR that the institute had stopped entering new U.S. collaborations and was generally advising employees against traveling to the United States for conferences, meetings or research. Established partnerships with trusted American researchers continue.
On July 18, Ilisimatusarfik Rector Mari Kleist disclosed to KNR that Greenland’s university had adopted its own cautious approach during 2025. Existing projects remain in place, while prospective collaborations are evaluated individually.
Kleist told KNR’s Markus Valentin that neither government departments nor intelligence services instructed the university to adopt the policy. Ilisimatusarfik made the decision itself while remaining in regular contact with Greenlandic authorities and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, known as PET.
GINR likewise described ongoing dialogue with relevant government departments, PET and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service. KNR’s report did not say whether the institute had received any official recommendation concerning new American cooperation.
Security Scrutiny Extends to an Ally
Research security discussions in Denmark and Greenland have traditionally concentrated on Russia, China and Iran.
KNR reported, citing the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, that Danish universities have raised security around international research cooperation to a level higher than during the Cold War.
Marianne Holmer, dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Southern Denmark and chair of the Academy’s Research Policy Committee, told KNR that researchers should now also evaluate American cooperation critically, particularly where Greenland is concerned.
Those assessments came from the Academy and one of its committee chairs, not from a publicly announced PET policy. PET participates in Ilisimatusarfik’s screening process and conducts background checks, but the intelligence service has not publicly placed the United States in a formal category alongside Russia, China and Iran.
Kleist said Ilisimatusarfik would prefer screenings or assessments for most collaborations. Established relationships, previous vetting or longstanding trust between institutions may make another review unnecessary.
The university has not experienced an unusual increase in American approaches, and Kleist identified no specific incident involving Ilisimatusarfik.
She said the university would generally avoid initiating new cooperation until conditions were “more or less normalized” and a proposed relationship was considered safe. She did not explain who would determine that normalization had occurred or which events would satisfy the university’s standard.
Institutional Overlap Worth Clarifying
Mari Kleist became rector of Ilisimatusarfik on December 1, 2025, after serving as prorector earlier that year.
Her husband, Mininnguaq Kleist, is permanent secretary of Greenland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Research. In January, KNR identified him as the official leading Greenland’s participation in the working group established among Greenland, Denmark and the United States.
The group included Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen and U.S. State Department Counselor Mike Needham. Its creation followed high level talks in Washington over the future of the Greenland / U.S. relationship.
The marriage is relevant because Mari Kleist says Ilisimatusarfik remains in contact with government departments while emphasizing that none instructed the university to restrict new American cooperation.
The public record does not establish that Mininnguaq Kleist participated in the university’s decision. Ilisimatusarfik has not said that the trilateral working group will determine when its policy changes.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Research is responsible for two areas directly involved in the story, and its permanent secretary leads Greenland’s negotiations with the country whose research relationships are now receiving additional scrutiny.
The institutional overlap nevertheless makes the decision-making process a legitimate subject of public interest. The relevant questions concern process rather than presumed influence: how Ilisimatusarfik approved the policy, which public authorities it consulted and what criteria will govern its eventual review.
Student Welfare Beyond the United States
Some Ilisimatusarfik students are legally required to spend time abroad as part of their education. The university therefore maintains agreements with institutions abroad for student placements and PhD exchanges.
Kleist said Ilisimatusarfik has a responsibility to provide suitable partner institutions and protect students from ending up in difficult or problematic situations.
The duty of care she described invites a question about how the university evaluates conditions in other destinations, including Denmark, where many Greenlandic students pursue their education.
A 2023 report by the Danish Institute for Human Rights found that negative comments and unfavorable treatment were commonly reported by the Greenlandic students in Denmark who answered its survey. The survey was conducted in November and December 2022 and sent to 510 students affiliated with the four Greenlandic Houses in Denmark. It received 147 responses, a 29 percent response rate.
Among the 135 students who answered the relevant questions, 73 percent reported receiving unpleasant or offensive comments about Greenland or Greenlanders to some degree during the preceding 12 months. Forty-six percent said this occurred always, often or sometimes, while 27 percent selected rarely.
In a separate question, 23 percent said that during the preceding 12 months they had always, often or sometimes felt negatively treated in their current education because of their Greenlandic background.
KNR’s interview did not address how Ilisimatusarfik incorporates those findings into its placement decisions or what support it provides to Greenlandic students who experience discrimination in Denmark.
A credible student welfare policy should explain how risks to students are evaluated across destinations. The university’s duty of care does not end at any particular border.
Similar Restrictions, Different Reasons
GINR cited concerns about political interference in American science, control over research data and entry requirements affecting foreign researchers. Nymand referred to reports of researchers being stopped at U.S. airports and said the institute would have limited ability to assist if one of its employees were held by American authorities. In the interview, she did not cite any such incident involving a GINR employee or Greenlandic citizen.
Nymand also noted that the institute had previously broken with partners in Russia and China. By placing the American restrictions in that context, she implicitly subjected the United States to a risk framework previously associated with adversarial states, even though the travel concern she described was precautionary rather than based on a reported GINR incident.
Ilisimatusarfik applies individual assessments and leaves room for new cooperation under the right conditions. Kleist offered the hypothetical example of an Inuit culture project proposed by university colleagues in Alaska, saying such a proposal would likely be evaluated on its merits.
Her example indicates that institutional history, Arctic relationships and established trust may weigh in favor of proceeding despite the university’s initial caution.
Both institutions have nevertheless created a higher threshold for prospective American partners. The immediate effect will be difficult to measure because existing projects continue and no list of rejected proposals has been made public.
The consequences appear earlier, when a researcher considers making an approach, an administrator evaluates whether a proposal is worth advancing or a Greenlandic institution decides whether the uncertainty surrounding an American partnership can be justified.
What Is the Danish Realm Protecting?
Greenland’s Act on Greenland Self-Government recognizes the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination under international law. Section 21 provides that if the people of Greenland choose independence, negotiations must begin between the Danish government and Naalakkersuisut. Any resulting agreement requires the consent of Inatsisartut and the Danish Parliament and must be endorsed in a Greenlandic referendum.
Foreign, defense and security policy, however, cannot be transferred under the Act and remain responsibilities of the Realm. Naalakkersuisut may nevertheless negotiate and conclude certain international agreements concerning matters Greenland has assumed.
That arrangement creates a tension visible throughout this research story. Realm institutions have a legitimate responsibility to protect Greenland from coercion, political interference and security risks. Those same institutions retain considerable influence over Greenland’s external relationships while the country develops the economic, academic and diplomatic connections that genuine independence would require.
American pressure has given Greenland and Denmark substantial reasons for caution. Direct relationships with American universities and research institutions could also expand Greenland’s choices beyond Denmark. Limits on new research relationships may protect Greenland during the immediate political crisis while narrowing its ability to build independent international connections over time. Both effects can occur without a written order or coordinated plan.
Denmark’s stated position is that Greenland’s future belongs to Greenlanders. The deeper test will be whether Greenland is truly able to pursue a path that weakens the Danish Realm or to build relationships Copenhagen would not support.
Is the current security posture protecting Greenland’s right to determine its own future or protecting the Danish Realm from the consequences of that right?
Sources: KNR reports by Markus Valentin dated July 12, July 13 and July 18, 2026; KNR profile by Helle Nørrelund Sørensen and Ann-Sophie Greve Møller dated January 31, 2026; Danish Institute for Human Rights, “Grønlandske studerende i Danmark” (“Greenlandic Students in Denmark”), 2023; Act on Greenland Self-Government.
GreenlandEnergy.com provides independent analysis of Greenland’s energy landscape, critical minerals development, and Arctic geopolitics. For corrections or feedback: press@greenlandenergy.com
